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Abstract 
This paper seeks to determine the effect of summer jobs offered by the 
public sector on high-school students’ labour market achievement by use 
of quasi-experimental data. Many municipalities in Sweden offer summer 
jobs within their organizations to high-school students. The municipality 
of Falun randomly allocates about 200 such summer jobs per year by a 
lottery. Because of this, the effect of a summer job might be determined 
while the issue of self-selection bias is controlled. Our study finds that 
summer jobs slightly improve the earnings immediately after graduation 
from high school, but the effect does not persist. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper investigates whether a summer job experience helps youths to 
improve their future earnings when they enter the labour market. This 
topic carries important implications to labour policy makers worldwide, as 
it assesses whether early contact with the labour market is an advantage to 
the youths and therefore whether a government should help to smooth the 
transition from school to work for the youths, as discussed by Schröder 
(2004). 
Job experience during the summer vacation is common among high 
school students in most developed countries. It is reported that the taking 
up rates of summer jobs are increasing in the recent decades in USA as 
well as in many countries in Europe (Grossman, 1997). Many governments 
have even implemented various policies to stimulate the expansion of 
summer jobs and promote student vacation employment. The Clinton 
Administration’s ambitious “national services plan” is one example and 
the USA Labor Department’s “summer job program” in the early 1990s is 
another (US News & World Report, June.5, 1993). Since summer jobs 
happen at a crucial period for the youth’s personality development, social 
senses, and human capital accumulation, it may even be that there are 
external effects of summer jobs on the society as a whole.  
Ruhm (1997) provides a survey of the literature on how school-year 
employment might affect high school students’ future earnings when they 
enter the labour market. By intuition, most people would like to think that 
the summer job experience should be beneficial to the students and their 
future outcomes. Favourable arguments are: summer jobs help teenagers to 
mature faster than otherwise and they provide skills and knowledge that 
complements in-class education; the summer jobs give high-school 
students feedback on what they have learned, and offer hints what they 
need to study and enhance their motivations to study; the earnings from 
summer jobs can help poor students to relax their financial constraints on 
future education and human capital investment; the students may use the 
summer jobs to smooth the transition from school to work by collecting 
information and establishing a social network that helps in finding the first 
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(2004). 
However, the potential negative consequences of summer job 
experiences are also discussed in the literature (Ruhm, 1997). For instance, 
summer jobs with heavy commitment may make students too exhausted 
and less fit for the new semester; too easy money from summer jobs may 
detract students’ interest in the “boring” and seemingly “unproductive” in-
class education; too early contacts with society may destroy teenagers if 
they are not well protected from bad social behaviours (Weller et al., 
2003). 
Arguments aside, the effect of a summer job experience is left to be 
identified empirically, which is a rather difficult task. First, there are very 
few datasets suitable for this purpose. Information about summer jobs and 
holders of such are rarely kept in record. Second, the methodology to 
analyze this question faces some challenges; the biggest one is the issue of 
selection bias: A summer job follows as a consequence of an active job-
searching process, and any correlation between a summer job experience 
and later outcomes may be due to unobserved individual abilities rather 
than being a causal relationship. In principle, this problem could be 
overcome by the appropriate conditioning of confounding variables. But 
the access to and the knowledge about such variables is often lacking.   
For this study, we have access to quasi-experimental data. Since 1995, 
the municipality of Falun, a mid-size town in Central Sweden, allocated 
the publicly-provided summer jobs to all high school applicants on a 
lottery basis. Since the offers of summer jobs were randomly allocated to 
the applicants, it exists a unique quasi-experimental setting in which there 
is good control of the potential selection bias. Furthermore, we have data 
of good quality providing detailed background information of the 
applicants for those who were offered a summer job as well as for those 
who were not, including variables such as age, gender, school and class, 
grades, and lengths and frequencies of summer jobs. We follow the 
applicants of the years 1995 to 2002 (except for 1996), and compare the 
ensuing earnings, after they have finished high-school and entered the 
labour market, for those with a summer job with those without a summer 
job. 
We find that summer jobs improve the earnings at the initial period on 
the labour market, but there are no significant long-run effects. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized into three parts. Section 2 
describes the data we use in this paper and Section 3 presents the 
identification strategy and utilizes the data to examine the effect of 
summer jobs on earnings. Finally, section 4 states our major findings and 
provides a concluding discussion relating to other relevant studies. 
2  Data description  
For the evaluation purpose, this paper employs the experimental database 
and compares the labour market outcomes between the high school 
students who took the summer jobs with these who did not. Since 1995, 
the municipality of Falun offers summer jobs to the high school students 
during the summer vacations every year in order to assist the youth to get 
the early contact with the labour market and thus an easier transition from 
the school to the labour market when they graduate.
1 The municipality 
offers summer job opportunities within the organization and assigns the 
summer jobs to all high school student applicants on a lottery base.
2 Such 
practice actually comprises an ideal social experiment to test the effects of 
summer jobs. Here the treatment group is those who applied and got a 
summer job at the municipality of Falun while the control group is those 
who applied but were denied a summer job. 
Every summer, the municipality offers around 200 summer jobs and 
around 800 high school students apply for these jobs of among 
approximately 2,700 students enrolled in the high schools in Falun. 
The summer jobs offered by the municipality are three weeks with tasks 
related to the activities that take place in the municipality. One major 
activity is in Health and Care which is about taking care of elderly people 
in the resting homes, a job that is rarely offered in the private sector. 
Another major activity is cleaning jobs in the properties of the munici-
                                                      
1 In this paper, we consider high school students those of an age ranging between 16 and 19 
years. 
2 The summer jobs at the municipality of Falun are fully comparable to summer jobs in the 
private sector regarding factors like working hours, obedience to the supervisor, the need to 
show positive attitude towards colleagues and customers, to perform the tasks well, and to 
show ambition. 
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maintained by the municipality. 
The municipalities in Sweden run the schools and starting from the year 
2002, the municipality of Falun offers a summer-school directed to pupils 
at the upper elementary school in English, Swedish and Mathematics. 
Strong students at the last year of high-school could apply for a summer 
job at the municipality as a teaching position.
 3 For all other activities all 
high-school students were considered eligible for the summer job. 
 
Table 1 Number of students who applied for a summer job at the 
municipality of Falun 






























The jobs are offered only during the summer and the workplace (being 
for instance the cleaning department or the maintenance department) was 
compensated from the municipality so that the summer jobs should only 
marginally affect the budget of the activity. The payment is between 42 
and 52 SEK (i.e. €4–5) per hour depending on age (students working as 
tutors at the summer school were paid 60 SEK).  
Altogether, our data set contains the information of all the 4,810 high 
school students aged 16–19 who applied for summer jobs offered by the 
                                                      
3 The year 2002, there were 57 applicants to the teaching position and 8 were offered after 
the lottery. The remaining 49 took part in the ordinary lottery of the summer jobs. We can 
not identify the 8 “teachers” amongst the applicants, which might bias the results slightly. 
However, the fact that they are only 8 out of 2 142 makes us believe that the problem can 
be regarded as minor. 
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municipality of Falun between 1995 and 2002, excluding 1996.
4 The more 
detailed annual information with reference to the distribution of the data is 






















Figure 1 Schematic description of applying for and holding a summer job 
at the municipality. 
 
In Table 1, Applicants denote the number of high school students who 
applied for the summer jobs at the municipality and Non-applicants 
indicates the number of students who did not apply for the summer jobs at 
the municipality of Falun. The last term in Table 1, Total, stands for the 
total high school students aged 16–19 in the municipality in every year. 
The year of 1995 is the first year when the municipality began to offer the 
summer jobs. Presumably, the practice was not widely known to the 
                                                      
4 The municipality of Falun lost the file concerning the information of summer jobs in 
1996.   
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1995. 
The schematic description of this social experiment is provided in 
Figure 1. It shows three groups consisting of students with a summer job: 
Group 1 is those who applied, were offered and accepted a summer job at 
the municipality of Falun; Group 2 is those who applied for, but were 
denied, a summer job at the municipality yet found one with another 
employer; Group 3 is those who did not apply but found a summer job by 
themselves at another employer. 
We obtain administration data of summer job applicants from the 
municipality of Falun. This data contains the information of their civic 
registration numbers, whether and when they participated in the summer 
jobs as well as some personal characteristics. Meanwhile, Statistics 
Sweden (SCB) supplied us with more detailed information like the ensuing 
labour market outcomes, demographic and households’ characteristics as 
well as lower secondary and high-school grades. 
In Table 2 the individual labour market earnings from the summer jobs 
is presented for all high-school students in Falun with a summer job. The 
mean earnings vary a little from year to year and correspond to about 70 
percent of an average adult worker’s monthly earnings. Hence, it is a 
qualified guess that the students work on average about four to five weeks 
during the summer vacation, which is between eight to ten weeks. The 
high maximum earnings indicate that there are some students who are not 
only holding a summer job, but also work substantial hours during the 
other parts of the year. 
 
Table 2 Annual earnings of summer jobbers in SEK and deflated by CPI. 
              Year 
Earnings 
1995 1997 1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Mean  9 064  9 090  12 560  9 692  10 550  9 856  11 183 
Maximum  59 101  66 066  19 533  11 1734  11 9456  62 513  110 200 
 
Table 3 shows the age distribution of the students who applied for a 
summer job at the municipality. The distribution is roughly uniform until 
1998, when there is a shift to the left in the centre of the distribution 
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meaning that older high-school students were less inclined to apply for a 
job at the municipality. 
 
Table 3 The age distribution of applicants. 
   Year 
Age 
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
16  37  101 140 194 247 274 164 
17  41  197 249 331 314 346 282 
18  53  152 291 279 258 245 222 
19  27 120  198 16  4  7  21 
Total  158 570 878 820 823 872 689 
  
Figure 2 shows the proportion of students holding a summer job of all 
high school students in Falun for the years 1995 to 2002, excluding 1996. 
In general, almost 100 percent of the applicants who were offered a 
summer job by the municipality also accepted it, while around 60 percent 
of the denied applicants still managed to find a summer job at some other 
employer than the municipality. The latter figure is similar to the 
proportion of non-applicants who managed to find a job. The fact that the 
proportion amongst the denied applicants is as high as 60 percent has some 
implication for the evaluation of the policy of the municipality. Clearly the 
students would have had a high chance of finding a summer job even in 
the absence of this policy. This issue will be discussed in the next section. 














































Figure 2 The proportion of summer jobs. The curves are shown for 
applicants with and without an offer from the municipality as well as for 
those who did not apply for a summer job at the municipality. 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show whether the summer job ratio differs by age 
group by showing the young students (16–17 years) and old students (18–















































Figure 3 The proportion of summer jobs in the age 16–17 years. The 
curves are shown for applicants with and without an offer as well as for 
those who did not apply for a summer job at the municipality. 
 















































Figure 4 The proportion of summer jobs in the age 18–19 years. The 
curves are shown for applicants with and without an offer as well as for 
those who did not apply for a summer job at the municipality. 
  
In Figures 5–7, the median earnings from the summer job is shown. The 
solid lines show those who were offered a summer job at the municipality, 
the dashed lines show those who applied and were denied a summer job at 
the municipality and the dotted lines show the median earnings for the 
non-applicants. Figure 5 shows the median annual earnings of summer job 
takers for all high school students, ages 16–19, over 1995–2002, except for 
1996.  The difference between the applicants is small, no matter whether 











































Figure 5 The median annual earnings for summer jobbers in SEK and 
deflated by CPI. The curves are shown for applicants with and without an 
offer from the municipality as well as for those who did not apply for a 
summer job at the municipality. 
 
However, the non-applicants earned much more from private summer 
jobs than applicants. This indicates that there is a large difference between 
the applicants and non-applicants. Non-applicants may have stronger 
earnings capability or be more informed about good summer job oppor-
tunities or for some other reasons have better offers in hand and these 
reasons might also explain why they did not bother with applying at the 
municipality. The difference in earnings may be due to the different wages 
or different number of worked hours or both. 
It should be noted, though, that the summer jobs at the municipality are 
neither better nor worse than the private summer jobs in terms of earnings 
comparing only successful and unsuccessful applicants. 
If we decompose the students into two age-groups, 16–17 and 18–19 
years, we find that the difference between applicant and non-applicant is 
small in the 16–17 group whereas it is high in the 18–19 group. This may 
reflect that when students are young, their individual capability does not 
vary a lot, but as they become mature, the individual heterogeneity 
becomes a matter of concern. Meanwhile, for 16–17 applicants, the 
summer jobs provided by the municipality of Falun seem to show 
advantages relative to private ones in 2001. 







































Figure 6 The median annual earnings for summer jobbers in SEK and 
deflated by CPI (age 16–17 years). The curves are shown for applicants 
with and without an offer from the municipality as well as for those who did 





































Figure 7 The median annual earnings for summer jobbers in SEK and 
deflated by CPI (age 18–19 years). The curves are shown for applicants 
with and without an offer from the municipality as well as for those who did 
not apply for a summer job at the municipality. 
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate whether summer jobs would 
positively or negatively affect one’s future labour market performance and 
economic attainment. We have to examine this question empirically. And, 
we will focus only on the applicants, since we do not know how the non-
applicants were selected into summer jobs. 
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effect 
As previously stated, we focus only on the applicants to determine the 
effect of a summer job on the ensuing earnings. The data set contains 
4,810 applications
5. However, the students may have applied several times 
over the years and we classify her as a summer jobber if at least once she 
has been offered and accepted a job. For example, let’s assume we have 
three students, A, B and C. All of them applied for a summer job in three 
consecutive years. Student A got a summer job in years 1 and 2. Student B 
got a summer job in year 3, but Student C never got a summer job in these 
three years. In this example students A and B are classified into the 
summer job group, whereas student C is classified into the non-summer 
job group. This way of classification leaves us with 3,197 students 
classified as summer jobbers or non-summer jobbers. 
The consecutive offers might have effect on the student’s future 
earnings since several summer jobs might leave to a greater effect than a 
single summer job. We have chosen to neglect such potential dose effect 
since the vast majority (92%) where offered summer jobs only once by the 
municipality. Hence, in the empirical analysis it should be understood that 
the effect refers to summer job but to a small extent it is masked by the 
effect of multiple summer jobs. 
Figur 8 is a part of Figure 1, thus, the definition and explanation of the 
figure are the same as in the previous section. The reference numbers of 
the groups and the sub-groups are given in the figure. As mentioned 
before, all applicants are randomized to summer jobs by a lottery. It is not 
obvious whether summer jobbers should be compared to non-summer 
jobbers (i.e. Groups 11 and 21 against Groups 12 and 22) or whether 
applicants with an offer should be compared with denied applicants (i.e. 
Group 1 against Group 2). This issue is discussed in subsections 3.1 and 
3.2, but for the time being we focus on a comparison between offered and 
denied applicants since the lottery was designed for this purpose. 
                                                      
5 This figure includes applicants of age under 16. We have however excluded the 
applications that were submitted while the student was of an age less than 16. 
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Table 4 shows more detailed information of applicants in order to 
examine whether there is any systematic difference between the applicants 
with an offer and applicants that were denied. If the lottery was fair we 
would not expect any difference between the treatment group (offered) and 
















Figur 8 The illustration of potential treatment groups and control groups. 
 
In Table 4 the lower secondary grade of applicants is the percentile ranked 
grade point average. In Sweden, the grading system was reformed 1997 
and in order to connect the grades of the old system to that of the new 
system, we have used the percentile rank of the grades. As Table 4 shows, 
the variable Age is statistically significant at a 5% level. The difference in 
age between the treatment group and control group is approximately half a 
year. The reason for a significant difference in age may be due to 
rounding, for example, if the age of a student is 16.6 years, we consider 
her as 17 years. We know the year of birth and application but not the 
month of birth. Swedish labour laws make a distinction between those 
above and below 16. Most likely, students turning 16 after the summer 
would have a smaller chance of getting an offer, since they may have been 
deemed ineligible for a summer job. For this reason, the treatment group’s 
average age might be expected to be higher than the control group’s. 
There is no significant difference in the grades for offered and non-
offered applicants. It might however be a difference in Gender between the 
groups, even though for most years the difference is insignificant on 
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contacted the municipality but they have not been able to offer an 
explanation. Nor have we been able to come across a proper explanation to 
the gender difference. After having put much effort into explaining the 
difference, we are inclined to consider it a prank of the lottery and we 
maintain the belief that the lottery was fair and that the job offers were 
randomized.  
 
Table 4 A comparison of background variables for the applicants with and 




Year  Offer Non-offer Offer Non-offer Difference  Offer  Non-offer 
1995  17.27  17.29  0.45 0.54  0.09 0.60 0.59 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.06) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) 
1997  17.88*  17.39  0.34 0.43  0.09 0.56 0.62 
  (0.11) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) 
1998  18.11*  17.37  0.43 0.39  -0.04 0.59 0.62 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
1999  17.65*  16.92  0.35 0.44  0.09*  0.60 0.60 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
2000  17.41*  16.92  0.35 0.48  0.13*  0.61 0.60 
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
2001  17.39*  16.81  0.48 0.52  0.04 0.63 0.61 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
2002  17.57*  17.04  0.37 0.49  0.12*  0.64 0.62 
  (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
Notes: *significant at 5% level, values in parentheses are standard errors. Difference is the 
difference between Non-offer and offer. a) The proportion of males. b) The student’s lower 
secondary grade, as a percentile rank.               
 
We now turn to the question whether offered should be compared to not-
offered applicants or whether summer jobbers should be compared to non-
summer jobbers. 
3.1  Intention-to-treat analysis (ITT) 
Intention-to-treat is an analysis approach for randomized controlled trials 
that compares observations in the groups to which they were originally 
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randomly assigned, regardless of whether they actually satisfied the entry 
criteria, regardless of whether they actually received the treatment, and 
ignoring subsequent withdrawal or deviation from the protocol (Hollis & 
Campbell, 1999). Hence, the principle of ITT analysis is that all 
observations must be analyzed with respect to the group to which they 
were randomized and a popular phrase used to describe ITT analysis is 
"Analyze as randomized!" (Dallal, 2004). An ITT analysis maintains the 
treatment groups (and the control groups) that are similar apart from the 
random variation. This is of course the one reason for randomizing, and 
this feature may be lost if the analysis is not performed on the groups 
produced by the randomization process. 
In our case, the treatment group is those who got the offers of summer 
jobs from the municipality of Falun and the control group is those who 
were not offered a summer job by the municipality, that is, Group 1 and 
Group 2 as described in Figur 8. Table 5 shows how the effect of a 
summer job may be defined and for the ITT analysis the estimate is 
obtained by taking the difference between α1 and α2. The estimates of the 
ITT-parameters are shown in Table 6. 
As stated above, all individuals randomly assigned to one of the 
treatments are analyzed together, regardless of whether or not they 
completed or received that treatment. However, sometimes it happens that 
some of the individuals in a randomized controlled study do not actually 
receive the treatment to which they were assigned. There can be many 
reasons for this: for instance, in our case, a student may give up the 
summer job opportunity for some private reason even if she had such an 
offer.  
Deviations from randomized allocation often result in missing outcome 
data. For this study, almost everyone offered also accepted the summer 
job. However, a majority who were not offered managed, nevertheless, to 
find a summer job with another employer. A full application of ITT 
analysis is possible only when complete outcome data are available for all 
randomized subjects. Hence, the fact that the control group consists of 
summer jobbers implies that ITT-estimates is informative on the effect of 
being offered a summer job, which is not equivalent to actually having the 
experience of a summer job. To deal with this shortcoming of the ITT 
analysis we will also implement an on-treatment analysis as discussed 
below. 
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The alternative to an ITT analysis is the on-treatment analysis. Here, the 
treatment group is defined as those who were offered and accepted a 
summer jobs at the municipality of Falun as well as those who were not 
offered a summer job by the municipality, but nonetheless found a summer 
job by themselves (i.e., the subgroups 11 and 21 in Figur 8), whereas the 
control group is those who were offered a summer job by the municipality, 
but turned down the job offers as well as those who were not offered by 
the municipality and failed or did not bother to find a summer job with 
another employer (i.e., subgroups 12 and 22 in Figure 8). The effect of a 
summer job according to the OT analysis is defined to be the difference 
between  β1 and β2 as illustrated in Table 5. The estimates of OT-
parameters are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 5 The effects of summer jobs. ITT = α1 – α2 and OT = β1 – β2. 
 SJ  Non-SJ   
Offers Group-11  Group-12  α1
(Group-1) 
Non-offers Group-21  Group-22  α2
(Group-2) 
  β1
(Groups 11 and 21) 
β2
(Groups 12 and 22) 
 
 
In the analysis we need a measure that describes the centre of the 
distribution, for each group, of the outcome variable, being future 
earnings. We consider the median preferable to the mean since the 
distribution might be skewed and may be contaminated with outliers, for 
instance due to a few students working all around the year. In Table 5, 
ITT-parameters α1 and α2 denote the median of labour market earnings of 
the applicants who were and were not offered a summer job at the 
municipality, respectively. The OT-parameters β1 and β2 denote the 
median of labour market earnings of the applicants with and without a 
summer job, respectively. The notation is maintained in Table 6 which 
provides the resulting estimates of the parameters. 
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3.3 Results   
Table 6 gives the earnings of the former high school students when they 
were 19 years old (as year 0) and entered the labour market, and the 
evolution of the earnings over the subsequent years up to seven years after 
finishing high-school. We assume that the high school students graduate at 
19 years, and then enter the labour market. In reality some few students 
may actually graduate one year before or after the age of 19 due to 
deviations from the standard schooling schedule. 
The earnings are the real earnings as they have been deflated by CPI in 
2002 as the base year. In Table 6,  and  are the number of students 
who were offered a summer job at the municipality and the number who 
were not offered, respectively. Likewise  and    stand for the 






Table 6 The effect of summer jobs on median earnings for high school 
students after graduation at the age of 19 years. 
Year (t)  α1 α2 α1 – α2 β1 β2 β1 – β2
  ( ) 
1 α N ) (
2 α N     ( ) 
1 β N ) (
2 β N    
t=0  53427 43730 9697* 49219 44067 5153 
  (940) (1202)    (1430)  (712)   
t=1  45950 42030  3920 44443 42200 2243 
  (742) (966)    (1158)  (550)   
t=2  47906 54700 -6794 51057 52600 -1543 
  (579) (687)    (884) (382)   
t=3  43900 53500 -9600 48408 53259 -4850 
  (387) (481)    (602) (266)   
t=4  50562 63000  -12438*  55975 59551 -3575 
  (237) (279)    (371) (145)   
t=5  97242 53000 44242 84750 42955 41795 
  (83) (141)    (174) (50)   
t=6  174055 76100  97955 142695 46411 96284 
  (39) (39)    (70)  (8)   
t=7  218400 91500 126900  204200 69300 134900 
  (15) (11)    (23)  (3)   
  Note: * Significant at 5% level according to the Wilcoxon- Mann-Whitney (WMW) test. 
 
We have pooled the applicants from the years 1995, 1997–2002 into one 
data set and the table shows the outcome for the pooled data. The reason 
for pooling is of course a desire to base the estimates on a large data set. 
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five years after graduation, is meagre, which is due to the fact that only the 
applicants of 1995 have been observed for sufficiently many years after 
graduation. 
Within each year, the summer job allocation procedure is random. 
Therefore, we should only compare summer jobbers to non-summer 
jobbers who applied the same year. We have done this to see whether the 
time effect seems similar for different application cohorts. To be 
approximately true we decided to pool the cohorts in order to get higher 
precision in the estimates. The interpretation should of course be that we 
estimate the time effect as an average over the application cohorts. In 
appendix 1 we show the year-by-year outcomes. 
Conventionally, earnings data is analysed after transforming the 
original earnings by a log-transformation with a wish that the 
transformation leads to a normal distribution such that the common t-test 
can be employed. The problem of this approach is that simply comparing 
the means of the log-transformed data in two groups can produce a 
different conclusion to a comparison of the means of the original data 
(Krishnamoorthy & Mathew, 2003). To examine the effects of summer job 
experiences on high school students, according to the result of Wang 
(2006), the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test is employed here and 
the results are illustrated in Table 6. In addition, we have also used the t-
test with the log-transform data. 
From Table 6, we do find a positive sign on the summer job effects and 
it is statistically significant at the initial period of entering the labour 
market. However, after 4 years of graduation, the difference is significant 
as well. It seems that there is a negative effect on the students who 
continue to study in the university at the initial period of entering the 
labour market. However, the effect of summer job experiences is only 
statistically significant at the initial period of entering the labour market 
but statistically insignificant in all later periods. It looks like that the effect 
of the summer job participation, if there is any, vanishes quickly. 
Furthermore, focusing on the results from the on-treatment analysis, the 
summer jobs seem to have no effect at all for the high school students. 
Recall, though, that the on-treatment analysis might be subject to selection 
bias as the original randomization procedure is distorted in this approach. 
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An intriguing fact is that the estimated long-term effect is very large, 
although statistically insignificant. It would have been nice to have access 
to a larger sample which would reduce the statistical uncertainty. How-
ever, the standard errors of the estimates could also be reduced by condi-
tioning on variables which contributes to the variation in earnings. We do 
this below, but it should be recalled that the conditioning on the variables 
was not part of the randomization procedure and, therefore, the condi-
tioning might introduce selection bias and thereby rendering the results 
invalid. 
The approach is to use log-transformed earnings (w) and a regression 
model to test the summer job effects. The first pair of models estimates the 
effect of the offer on the log-transformed earnings as,  
 
(1a)  () it i t t it O a w 1 1 1 ln ε α + + =  
(1b)    () it
P
p
p ip i t t it x O a w 2
1
2 2 ln ε γ α + + + = ∑
=
where   is the earnings of the ith student t years after graduation and   
is an indicator taking on unity if the student was offered a summer job and 
zero otherwise. The error-term 
it w i O
ε  is assumed to be independent between 
students and over time. The background information, as a variable denoted 
x of which it is assumed to exist P, includes all the significant background 
variables, that is, gender, age, log of family earnings and the grade of 
lower secondary school as well as the year of application. The parameters 
of interest are  t 1 α  and  t 2 α  which show the effect of the offer on the log 
earnings. Table 7 gives the estimates of the two parameters. 
In a second pair of models the effect of a summer job is studied. The set 
up of the models is similar to Models (1a) and (1b), except for   being 
replaced with  , that is an indicator taking on unity if student i have had 




(2a)  () it i t t it SJ a w 3 1 3 ln ε β + + =  
(2b)  .  () it
P
p
p ip i t t it x SJ a w 4
1
2 4 ln ε φ β + + + = ∑
=
The estimates of  t 1 β  and  t 2 β  are shown in Table 7. 
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additional ones, such as, the parents sector of occupation, socioeconomic 
and migration status, but these variables were excluded since they were 
found to be statistically insignificant at the 5 % level. 
 
Table 7 The effect of an offer and a summer job on the log-earnings for 
high school students after graduation. 
Year (t)  Α1 α2 β1 β2
 (SE)  (SE)  (SE)  (SE) 
t=0  0.73* 0.89* 1.46* 1.72* 
  (0.18) (0.18)  (0.18) (0.19) 
t=1  0.01 0.15  0.41*  0.62* 
  (0.18) (0.18)  (0.19) (0.19) 
t=2  -0.14 0.10 0.33 0.57* 
  (0.20) (0.21)  (0.21) (0.22) 
t=3  0.04 0.02 0.27 0.31 
  (0.22) (0.24)  (0.24) (0.24) 
t=4  -0.60* -0.48  -0.12  0.05 
  (0.30) (0.33)  (0.33) (0.34) 
t=5  0.69 0.50  1.03*  1.01* 
  (0.44) (0.45)  (0.50) (0.51) 
t=6  0.64 0.58  3.16*  3.42* 
  (0.91) (0.94)  (1.47) (1.56) 
t=7  1.73 1.42 3.24 2.59 
  (1.55) (1.55)  (2.37) (2.45) 
 Note: * Significant at 5% level; values in the parentheses are standard errors. 
 
There is a small difference between Table 6 and Table 7 with regard to the 
effect of a summer job offer at the municipality, which should be expect as 
Table 7 provides the estimates of a different treatment parameter. How-
ever, the qualitative conclusion is, once again, that there is only a momen-
tary effect of the offer on the earnings after the graduation. 
The last column of Table 7 gives the effect-estimates of a summer job 
after controlling for background variables. The effect of a summer job is 
positive and sometimes statistically significant, and thus differs somewhat 
from what was reported in Table 6. It should, however, be recalled that the 
lottery concerned the offer, not the summer job, and therefore we can not 
rule out the possibility of selection bias in this result. 
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4 Concluding  discussion 
In this paper the effect of summer jobs on students’ later labour market 
outcomes is examined by both intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis and on-
treatment (OT) analysis on quasi-experimental data collected the 
municipality of Falun.  
The evidence in our study suggests that the experience of a summer job 
does provide a significant effect on the earnings when the students enter 
the labour market, but nearly no further effect on their later labour market 
performance. Hence, even if we accept that the summer job experiences 
have effects on earnings at the beginning period of post high school career, 
such effects are not persistent. This finding is consistent with Häkkinen 
(2003), where the author examined school-year employment among 
Finnish university students and found that working while enrolled at the 
university did have a positive impact on the graduates’ employment 
chances and earnings for the university students after graduation, but the 
effect vanishes as they stay on the labour market.  
Such an observation seems to imply that a summer job experience of 
high school students in Sweden only provide a short-run advantage via 
channels like early labour market contacts, but no effect on the student’s 
productivity as demanded by the Swedish labour market. It means that the 
summer jobbers may gain when entering in the labour market for reasons 
such as them being more familiar with the labour market institutions or 
with a better work habit.  
Our results contradict the findings of Ruhm (1997) in USA, where he 
found indications that school-year employment of high school students in 
the US helped them to gain skills and knowledge via on-the-job practice 
and thereby raised their long-term productivity. The inconsistence between 
our study and Ruhm (1997) could arise from the different empirical 
setting-ups and techniques used in the two papers, but most likely due to 
the differences in the contents and types of school-year employments in 
USA and Sweden, as well as in the differences between the labour market 
institutions of the two countries. But to substantiate the claim above, more 
future research is required to assess whether the summer jobs provided by 
the municipality of Falun is similar to the actual jobs available in Sweden 
or in USA. 
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students with a long–term advantage, a policy implication which can be 
drawn from our study is that, for the aim to make the summer job 
experiences more valuable and make government intervention in the 
youths’ transition from school to work more effective, the skills matching 
between summer jobs and actual jobs in the labour market should be paid 
more attention. 
Although, it would be very interesting to see what happens to the 
students’ long-run earnings when they participate in the summer job 
program and when they do not. We can not make any strong conclusion in 
this connection from our data as the numbers of observation in later years 
(from year 5 to 7) are comparatively low (cf Table 6). We acknowledge 
this shortcoming of the present of study and suggest further study in this 
direction with insuring sufficiently large data for the later years.  
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Appendix 1 
Table 1 The median earnings for offered and non-offered high school students after turning 19 years. 
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  Year 
 
t  Offer                           
             
Non-offer Offer Non-offer Offer Non-offer Offer Non-offer Offer Non-offer Offer Non-offer Offer Non-offer
t=0  287  207 297  357 524  452 575  525 735  534 708  304 278  472
  (82)  (71)              
               
               
                 
                
                  
                 
                  
                  
                   
                   
                    
                    
                    
                    
(80)  (328) (314)  (298) (202)  (319) (133)  (154) (121)  (31) (8) (1)
t=1  206  243 275  394 505  493 609  466 537  336 228  *
  (80)  (71) (81)  (329) (315)  (298) (197)  (212) (66)  (56) (3) (0)
t=2  277  283 519  553 535  573 438  549 243  *
  (79)  (70) (81)  (327) (293)  (229) (124)  (61) (2) (0)
t=3  343  525 429  525 483  553 836  953
  (79)  (69) (74)  (271) (229)  (134) (5) (7)
t=4  560  548 620  712 464  685
  (79)  (69) (45)  (171) (113)  (39)
t=5  967  901 977  447
  (58)  (56) (25)  (85)
t=6  1741  761
  (39)  (39)
t=7  2184  915
  (15)  (11)
Note: * is missing value; the unit is 100 SEK; values in parentheses are the number of students.    
             
Table 2 The median earnings of summer-jobbers and non-summer-jobbers after turning 19 years. 
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Year 
 
t  SJ                   
                         
Non-SJ  SJ Non-SJ  SJ Non-SJ SJ Non-SJ SJ Non-SJ SJ  Non-SJ SJ Non-SJ 
t=0  260 138 411 253 467 473 560 443 637 580 634 699 242  504
  (132)
 
                       
   
                         
         
                         
           
                       
             
                           
                
                   
                 
                   
                    






























































  t=3  384 809 493 470 497 524 940
 
1036













  t=4  498 965 623 706 517 413
  (132) (21) (140) (76) (104)
 
(48)
  t=5  947  1147 637  310
  (100)  (14) (74)
 
  (36)
  t=6  1427  464
  (70)  (8)
t=7  2042  693
  (23)  (3)
Note: * is missing value; the unit is 100 SEK; values in parentheses are the number of students. 
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